‘These people are disposable’: how Russia is using online recruits for a campaign of sabotage in Europe | Russia

As geopolitical tensions escalate, a silent battle is being waged through acts of sabotage and hybrid warfare, raising concerns about global security. From arson to cyberattacks,these covert operations aim to destabilize societies and sow discord,demanding a deeper look into the evolving methods of this dangerous game.This article uncovers the emerging trends in sabotage and hybrid warfare, revealing the key players, motivations, and the potential future threats shaping this shadow conflict.

The Rising Tide of Sabotage: Understanding the New Era of Hybrid Warfare

The world is witnessing a concerning shift in the landscape of conflict. Beyond traditional warfare, a new form of aggression is emerging: sabotage. This involves covert actions, often attributed to state actors, designed to disrupt infrastructure, sow discord, and destabilize societies.This article delves into the evolving tactics,motivations,and potential future trends of sabotage,offering insights into this complex and increasingly relevant threat.

From Cold War Tactics to Modern Hybrid Warfare

The roots of modern sabotage can be traced back to the Cold war. Intelligence agencies,like the KGB,employed sabotage as a key component of their strategy. Historical archives reveal that disrupting enemy infrastructure and economies was a core tenet of their doctrine. These early operations were frequently enough meticulously planned and executed, targeting specific strategic assets.

Did you know? The term “sabotage” itself originates from the French word “sabot,” a wooden shoe. During labor disputes, workers would throw their sabots into machinery to halt production.

Today, the nature of sabotage has evolved. While targeted attacks on military installations and critical infrastructure persist, the scope has broadened. The goals are no longer limited to military objectives; they now include influencing public opinion, destabilizing governments, and undermining economic stability. This shift reflects the rise of hybrid warfare, where conventional military actions are combined with cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and covert operations.

The New Players and Tactics of Disruption

The methods employed in modern sabotage are diverse and adaptable. State actors are increasingly leveraging a network of proxies, including organized crime groups, far-right extremists, and even seemingly ordinary citizens, to carry out their operations. This allows them to maintain plausible deniability while expanding the reach and impact of their actions.

Pro Tip: Stay informed about potential threats by monitoring official government alerts, cybersecurity reports, and reputable news sources. Be wary of unverified information circulating on social media.

Recent incidents highlight the evolving tactics. These include:

• attacks on Critical Infrastructure: Targeting power grids, communication networks, and transportation systems to cause widespread disruption.
• Cyber-Enabled Sabotage: using cyberattacks to disable or manipulate physical systems, such as industrial control systems.
• Economic Sabotage: Disrupting supply chains,spreading disinformation to damage businesses,and manipulating financial markets.
• Incendiary Attacks: Arson and other forms of purposeful fires targeting infrastructure and public spaces.

Case Study: The recent attacks on undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, and the fire at Heathrow Airport, are examples of the ambiguity surrounding these events. While the exact perpetrators remain unknown,the potential for disruption and the resulting climate of suspicion are notable.

The Future of Sabotage: Trends to Watch

The future of sabotage is highly likely to be characterized by several key trends:

• Increased sophistication: Sabotage operations will become more technically advanced,utilizing artificial intelligence,advanced cyber tools,and sophisticated physical techniques.
• Greater Frequency: as geopolitical tensions rise, the frequency of sabotage attacks is expected to increase.
• Blurred Lines: The distinction between state-sponsored and non-state actors will become increasingly blurred, making attribution more difficult.
• focus on Soft Targets: Attacks will increasingly target civilian infrastructure and public spaces, aiming to create fear and instability.
• Weaponization of Information: Disinformation campaigns will be used to amplify the impact of sabotage, sowing confusion and undermining trust in institutions.

Reader Question: How can individuals and organizations protect themselves from the threat of sabotage?

Mitigating the Risks: What Can Be Done?

Addressing the threat of sabotage requires a multi-faceted approach:

• Enhanced Cybersecurity: Strengthening cybersecurity defenses to protect critical infrastructure and data from cyberattacks.
• Improved Intelligence Gathering: Investing in intelligence capabilities to identify and disrupt sabotage operations before they occur.
• Public Awareness: Educating the public about the risks of sabotage and promoting vigilance.
• International Cooperation: Strengthening international cooperation to share information and coordinate responses to sabotage attacks.
• Resilience Planning: Developing plans to mitigate the impact of sabotage attacks and ensure continuity of essential services.

The rise of sabotage represents a significant challenge to global security. By understanding the evolving tactics, motivations, and potential future trends, we can better prepare for and mitigate the risks associated with this new era of hybrid warfare.

Did you know? The use of “illegals,” deep-cover operatives posing as ordinary citizens,is a tactic that has been revived in recent years,adding another layer of complexity to the threat landscape.

Stay informed,stay vigilant. Share this article with your network and letS work together to build a more resilient and secure future.

” said one senior European security official. “In the beginning some of these things look natural, but then it happens more and more and you start to wonder. You have cases where there is no proof, but we have strong suspicions.”

Manny of the same operatives from unit 29155 who have been involved in sabotage operations for more than a decade are part of the new campaign, western officials say. The unit has been folded into a bigger GRU department and is still run by its longstanding chief, Andrei Averyanov.

But now, the work on the ground is done by one-time operatives recruited over Telegram, rather than the unit’s staff officers, most of whom are no longer able to travel to Europe. And instead of focusing narrowly on specific targets closely related to the Ukraine war, the approach is much broader, targeting shopping centres, warehouses and other civilian infrastructure.

“The strategic aim is to sow discord and insecurity. They are not destroying significant infrastructure. They are concentrating on soft targets that influence a general perception of insecurity in society. This is classic psy-ops,” said Piotr Krawczyk, the former head of Poland’s foreign intelligence service.

The way Moscow recruits operatives and selects targets varies from country to country. in the Baltic states, the Russian services make use of the extensive family ties of the local Russian-speaking population, according to intelligence officials there. Recruitments are made during visits to Russia,and Telegram is then used for communication,rather than for making the initial contact. The motivating factor is usually either money or blackmail.

Puusepp said: “It’s not a question of ideology but of business and relatives inside Russia. When we look at the people, their overall understanding of the world is not about much more than survival.”

Elsewhere in Europe, people are recruited over Telegram, without any in-person interaction at all. some, like Serhiy, initially think they are talking to like-minded friends about a joint business project. Others may think they are working on the orders of white supremacist groups or domestic political actors.

Operatives are recruited via the gray employment groups where immigrants frequently enough find casual gig-economy work that pays under the counter. Frequently enough, they are people who have operated on the margins of the law for some time, and when the order comes to burn something down, they may think it is indeed part of a criminal dispute rather than intelligence work.

Some recruits do have an ideological affinity with Russia, such as Serhiy, who supported Russia’s war in Ukraine and longed for his native Odesa to become Russian-controlled. More frequently enough, though, there is no ideological component.

Last May,Polish authorities arrested a Pole and two Belarusians on suspicion of planning sabotage acts for the Russians inside Poland.All three men had previously fought in Ukraine on the side of Kyiv.

A seperate group of 16 saboteurs, mostly ukrainian and Belarusian men, was apprehended in Poland in early 2023 and later sentenced. This group mainly comprised people who had little sympathy for the Kremlin’s geopolitical goals but were simply looking to earn money in the gig economy.

The recruits were offered tasks in Poland that ranged from posting anti-Nato flyers to installing cameras that would monitor trains with humanitarian and military cargo bound for Ukraine. Payments, made in cryptocurrency, ranged from $5 for putting up a poster to $400 for installing a camera.

the group’s activities were directed by a man who identified himself only as “Andrei”, and who communicated with two of the group and told them to distribute tasks among the others.

One of the defendants, a 20-year-old Belarusian woman who was arrested and convicted with her boyfriend, claimed that neither of them were supporters of Russia’s war effort. Her boyfriend, she claimed, would often put up a poster, take a photo to provide proof, and then immediately pull it down.

“He was doing this to earn money for us, as I was spending a lot. He just did it to have some extra cash without thinking of the consequences,” she wrote in a letter to her family after her arrest. “This is the worst thing to happen to me in my whole life.”

In late February, serhiy was brought into a courtroom in Wrocław, dressed in the red prison overalls reserved for highly hazardous prisoners, his hands and legs in chains.

“The goal of the accused was to lower our morale,to question the effectiveness and competency of our state,and to question our support for Ukraine,” said the judge,Marcin Myczkowski,reading his verdict.

Serhiy looked on impassively, giving the occasional sigh, as an interpreter whispered the judge’s words into his ear. he had previously agreed a plea bargain with prosecutors in exchange for a three-year sentence but Myczkowski cancelled the deal, claiming it was too lenient.

Even though Serhiy had not, set anything on fire, and was arrested when he was about to board a bus out of the country, Myczkowski handed him an eight-year sentence. In part, the judge said, it was meant as a warning to others – “a clear and unequivocal signal to you and to all potential candidates that committing such acts is not worthwhile”.

For the Russians,the benefit of using one-time operatives is that,if something goes wrong,Moscow can discard them and leave them do their time in prison. No Russian diplomats are working behind the scenes to free Serhiy, and it is highly unlikely that he would be included in any prisoner exchange. Instead,the controllers at GRU headquarters can simply set up new Telegram accounts and start the process again.

“You jail one person and another pops up to take their place. These people are disposable and Moscow doesn’t care about them,” said a European security official.

The possibility that anyone looking for odd jobs on Telegram could be signing up for Russian intelligence missions sparks surveillance and privacy dilemmas reminiscent of counter-terrorism work, as authorities scramble to catch potential perpetrators before they act.

There is another question, too, brought into focus by the alleged aborted plot to send explosive packages to the US last year: what is the endgame?

One senior security official said that as Russia increasingly considers Europe a party to the war in Ukraine, the sabotage campaign is only likely to intensify as long as the war goes on. “They are crossing one red line after another and we don’t know how far they will go,” said the official.

Additional reporting by Ada Petriczko